Vir foto: pixabay

V ponedeljek je na Bledu potekal 15. strateški forum, ki ga je poleg krikov nekaterih, da se Slovenija zaradi vabljenih gostov oddaljuje od jedra Evrope, zaznamovala do sedaj najboljša udeležba voditeljev vlad in držav. Izjemno dinamičen predsedniški panel je znova pokazal na ločnico med Vzhodom in Zahodom Evrope, ki je očitno ene in druge politične elite ne razumejo prav dobro.

Vprašanje, ali zbrane države na odru ogrožajo koncept združene Evrope, je v tem primeru izzvalo le tekmovanje bolj pravičnih med pravičnimi, saj je vsak politik hitel dokazovati svoj prav.

Mir

Dejstvo je, da je cilj združene Evrope le eden – mir. Legitimno je, da do tega cilja vodi več poti in zaželeno je, da o različnih poteh do cilja razpravljamo na kulturnem nivoju. Kot je dejal politolog Jan Zielonka, je bila politična zgodovina Evrope izjemno raznolika ter je zaradi nje vsaka država nujno razvila unikatne poglede, ki jih je treba soočiti.

Dejstvo je tudi, da je bil trajnejši mir v Evropi prvič dosežen z ekonomskim prepletom Nemčije in Francije. Okoli njiju se je izgradil sistem, ki je njune apetite držal v ravnovesju. Očetom Evrope se imamo zahvaliti, da je postal človek subjekt in ne objekt oblastnega delovanja, njegova samouresničitev pa temeljni namen širše demokratične ureditve.

Ta sistem je očitno deloval tako dobro, da so ga države, ki jih Jacques Rupnik imenuje L’Autre Europe (Vzhodna in Srednja Evropa, op.a.) dojemale kot normalno stanje ter vse sile usmerile v to, da bi ta ideal dosegle. Tudi v Sloveniji: spomnite se teze o Mitteleuropi, ki so jo zagovarjali naši literati z Jančarjem na čelu, povezave Skrušnyja s Kundero in izpostavljanjem tega, da se Slovenija z demokracijo in samostojnostjo zopet vrača v objem evropskih narodov.

Demokratično vrenje konec 80. let je to vrnitev v normalno stanje dejansko omogočilo, vendar je na krivi nogi ujelo Francijo in Nemčijo. To se je v najbolj grobem smislu pokazalo pri največji širitvi leta 2004, ko Zahodna Evropa ni vedela, kaj naj z vzhodnim delom pravzaprav počne. Obenem se je s širitvijo porušilo ravnotežje med Nemčijo in Francijo.

Vzhodna in Srednja Evropa spadata pod tradicionalno interesno območje Nemčije. Apatični Francozi, na drugi strani pa Nemci, ki so to izkoristili. Dokaz je enormna okrepitev vloge Nemčije in njenega gospodarstva po širitvi.

Cilj demokratizacije, liberalizacije in evropeizacije je bil izključno vrnitev v normalnost, kar je v bistvu pomenilo, da moramo vsi postati kot oni.

Imitacija

Poleg vsega je prišlo tudi do podcenjevanja Zahoda. Zahod nikoli ni želel dojeti, da je bil Vzhod zaradi komunizma v petdesetletnem zaostanku pri izgradnji demokratičnih institucij. Temu so se sicer do določene mere posvetili pri pristopnih pogajanjih, po tem pa so mislili, da je njihova vloga opravljena.

Filozof Ivan Krastev je stanje briljantno opisal s primerjavo med imitatorji in imitiranci. Po padcu Berlinskega zidu lahko politično filozofijo postkomunističnih držav označimo z imperativom imitacija Zahoda. Cilj demokratizacije, liberalizacije in evropeizacije je bil izključno vrnitev v normalnost, kar je v bistvu pomenilo, da moramo vsi postati kot oni. Imitacija je bila razumljena kot najkrajša pot do svobode in blaginje, vendar je to vodilo v izgubo identitete. Ne gre, da skopiraš institucije in pričakuješ, da bodo delovale, temveč moraš te razvijati v skladu z značilnostmi lastnega okolja.

Na Vzhodu je po prvem valu navdušenja sledilo obdobje streznitve, ko so ljudje ugotovili, da so prepuščeni sami sebi ter so stvari reševali, kakor so pač vedeli in znali. Tu je naredila EU napako, da je pustila te države same. Že po petih letih pa se zaradi svetovne gospodarske krize s tem nihče zares niti ni več ukvarjal. Nekako je logično, da je takratna aroganca Zahoda pripeljala do arogance Vzhoda danes. Sploh, ker je Zahod z Brexitom zabil večji žebelj v idejo združene Evrope, kot ga bodo sposobne države na Vzhodu kadarkoli spraviti skupaj.

Izolacija

Ni prav, da se postkomunistične države odriva na rob. Izolacija nujno vodi v ekstrem in tega bi se morale zahodne države, ki so zibelka demokracije, zavedati še toliko bolj. Združitev Evrope se ni končala leta 2004. Tako kot v človeških odnosih, se bo poglobila in nadaljevala le, če bo prejemala stalno skrb ter bo stalno angažirana.

Vsaka evropska država ima svoje težave na področju vladavine prava in Slovenija ni izjema. Če želiš rasti, moraš biti stalno vpet v procese in učinkovito reševati probleme, ki jih imaš. Na področju zunanje politike je za nami desetletje mrtvega teka, ko smo želeli ugajati vsem in bili zaradi tega nezanimivi. V praksi sta bili dovolj dve akciji (pogajanja za evropski denar in strateški forum), pa smo se že hitro znašli v vlogi mostu med Zahodom in državami Višegrajske četverice.

Blejski forum je pokazal, da smo se začeli zavedati, da je jedro Evrope za Slovenijo naša soseščina. Kot je dejal govorec Ministrstva za zunanje zadeve, Aleksander Geržina, Slovenija v radiju 500 km ustvari skoraj 20 milijard EUR blagovne menjave. Šele, ko bomo uredili odnose s sosedi in širše, bomo res prepoznani kot kredibilen partner ter nas voditelji drugih držav ne bodo obiskovali le pred predsedovanji.

Če pa bomo konstruktivno sodelovali pri izgradnji institucij doma in v Evropi, pa nas trenutni voditelji niti ne bi smeli skrbeti.

13 KOMENTARJI

    • Zaradi te globalizacije (in EU), ki jo psujete, živimo v času, ko je možno po zmernih cenah fizično v trgovini ali pa preko spleta kupiti marsikaj, kar bi drugače ne bilo mogoče.

      Se strinjam – s stališča kulture se z globalizacijo (mult-kulti) ne soočamo najbolje (vsaj po mojem mnenju in okusu), a največ, kar lahko glede tega storimo sami je, da se v smeri ozaveščanja narodnosti trudimo v krogih, kjer se gibljemo in podpremo dogodke, ki to promovirajo s svojo udeležbo ali – še bolje – aktivnim sodelovanjem.

  1. “Dejstvo je tudi, da je bil trajnejši mir v Evropi prvič dosežen z ekonomskim prepletom Nemčije in Francije.” Res je, pot pa je bila dolga in polna preobratov, saj je imelo približevanje močne nasprotnike .

    “The Franco-German Friendship Pact of December 1938
    Franco-German relations were the bright spot on the European scene in October 1938. The French seemed much more advanced than their English neighbors in adjusting to the new situation which had been created by the events of 1938. Good relations with France increased Hitler’s confidence that it would be possible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement with Poland. The frontier tension and minority problems which had plagued Franco-German relations during the age of Bismarck were almost entirely lacking at this time. The most positive element in the situation was the willingness of Germany to accept the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Hitler granted a farewell audience to André François-Poncet on October 18, 1938. The French Ambassador had been the most popular foreign diplomat in Berlin. He was eager to accept a mission to represent France to both Italy and the Vatican, and to apply his charm to Mussolini. But the personalities of Hitler and Mussolini were very different, and François-Poncet never succeeded in establishing with Mussolini the friendly personal relations he had enjoyed with Hitler. The familiar atmosphere of cordiality between Hitler and the French diplomat was much in evidence on the occasion of their farewell conversation. Both men advocated a further improvement in Franco-German relations. Hitler made a formal offer of a Franco-German declaration of friendship, which could be used to settle points that had created anxiety in the relations between the two nations following the abrogation of the Locarno treaties in 1936. The French Government returned a favorable response to the German offer on October 21, 1938. The tentative provisions for a treaty were discussed in Paris by Bonnet and Count Welczeck, the German Ambassador to France. It was easy to agree on a formulation of Germany’s willingness to guarantee the eastern border of France. The problem of German recognition of the Eastern European alliances of France was more difficult. Welczeck and Bonnet managed to reach an agreement on these points as early as October 25, 1938. It was assumed that France would proceed to invite Ribbentrop to Paris to conclude the formal treaty. An element of delay was produced by the Polish passport crisis, which culminated in the murder of Ernst vom Rath in Paris by Grynszpan, and in anti-Jewish measures and demonstrations in Germany. The French were worried by this situation, and the Temps predicted on November 17, 1938, that the anti-Jewish measures would produce a lasting bad effect on the relations of the Anglo-Saxon countries with Germany. Weizsäcker came to Paris to attend the funeral of vom Rath, and to discuss the general situation with Bonnet. The two men established good relations. Weizsäcker assured Bonnet that he shared Hitler’s hope that there would be no third Franco-German war to blight the hopes of the present generation. It was evident that recent incidents and delays would not prevent the French and German leaders from proceeding with their plan to conclude the treaty. The Italian and English leaders proved to be extremely jealous in this situation. Italian Ambassador Attolico in Berlin had presented a message from Foreign Minister Ciano as early as November 8, 1938, containing a protest about the proposed provisions of the treaty, which had been communicated to the Italians by the Germans. Ciano complained that Mussolini had expected a “platonic” pact in the style of the Anglo-German declaration. He and Ciano objected to article three of the proposed draft, which provided for periodic consultation between Germany and France. The British leaders feared that France might shake off her dependence on Great Britain and arrive at an independent understanding with Germany. They realized that they had deprived France of many of her bulwarks against Germany by refusing to support French policy in the past, and that it would be a logical move for the French to retaliate. Halifax dealt with this theme at great length in instructions to Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador to France. Halifax on November 1, 1938, claimed to reject the theory that “the French Government might be tempted by German intrigue to drift apart from His Majesty’s Government.” He recognized that Germany had attained a preponderant position in Central Europe, but he was not inclined to abandon the thought of possible future British intervention in Central and Eastern Europe. He observed wryly that he found no pleasure in the prospect of becoming entangled by Russia in a war against Germany, yet said, “I should hesitate to advise the French Government to denounce the Franco-Soviet pact.” Tremendous changes had taken place in British policy since the time in 1935 when the British leaders had done what they could to prevent the conclusion of the pact. Halifax confided to Phipps that he would make a major effort to persuade Mussolini to be “less dependent on Hitler.” This move would aid the conduct of British balance of power policy against Germany. Halifax regarded it as axiomatic that Great Britain and France should remain preponderant in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Near East, and that they should keep a “tight hold” on their colonial empires. He also emphasized the need of maintaining “the closest possible ties” with the United States. The British Foreign Secretary admitted that this snug picture was disturbed by the prospect that France would leave the British system in order to achieve an independent understanding with Germany. He asserted that such a development would be a terrible blow to Great Britain, and he claimed that it might enable Germany “to hold us up to ransom” in the colonial question. Halifax was obviously worried, but he proclaimed again that he did not believe that France would “sign away her freedom.” Perhaps it would have been more truthful had he said that he did not believe France would attempt to regain her freedom. Another wave of verbal assaults on Hitler by prominent Englishmen occurred at this time, and new instructions from Halifax to Phipps on November 7, 1938, betrayed the fact that Halifax was increasingly worried by the Franco-German negotiations. This was an old and familiar nervousness on the part of British leaders. It arose when
    128it appeared that the leading continental nations might proceed to settle their differences independently of Great Britain. It was feared that this would destroy the British system of divide and rule by means of the balance of power. The British leaders believed that their position in the world depended upon the perpetuation of rivalries and divisions on the continent. The fears discussed by Halifax in 1938 were identical with those entertained by Sir Edward Grey in 1911, when Premier Joseph Caillaux of France and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg of Germany appeared to be approaching an understanding. The final text of the Franco-German declaration was approved by the French Cabinet on November 23, 1938. Much news of the pact leaked out to the public. The French press on November 24, 1938, was enthusiastic about the coming treaty, and it was called a milestone in world history. Chamberlain and Halifax had arrived in Paris on November 23rd for conferences with the French leaders on the following day. They hoped to obtain assurances which would diminish the importance of the Franco-German treaty. They were greeted with jeers and French booing (i.e. whistling) on the streets of Paris on November 23, 1938, in the first important anti-British manifestations in the French capital since the visit of King Edward VII to Paris in 1903. The announcement on the following day that Ribbentrop would soon visit Paris pushed their visit into the background of the public interest. The new French Ambassador to Germany, Robert Coulondre, had met Hitler for the first time on November 21, 1938. Cordial relations between Hitler and Coulondre were easily established, although the new ambassador could never replace François-Poncet in Hitler’s estimation. Coulondre declared that his assignment to Germany was a mission of reconciliation. He was absolutely convinced that Hitler was sincere in his renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine. Hitler replied that he and Coulondre were both old front fighters, and they knew how to appreciate the value of peace. The final preparations for Ribbentrop’s visit to Paris were concluded after this interview. The pact was completed several weeks before the departure of Ribbentrop and the German delegation for Paris. The Germans duplicated the French gesture of communicating the contents of the pact to the Poles, in advance of signature. Lipski expressed Beck’s gratitude for this courtesy in Berlin on December 5, 1938. Beck replied to the French by giving the pact his blessing and by claiming that the Polish Government sincerely welcomed the Franco-German rapprochement outlined in the treaty. Beck instructed Lipski to inform the Germans confidentially that the Soviet Union did not look on the Franco-German declaration with the same unmixed feelings. The Germans arrived in Paris and concluded the treaty with the French on December 6, 1938. The pact was virtually the same as the Anglo-German declaration except for the provisions relating to the guarantee question, the French eastern alliances, and the consultation clause. The Germans agreed to recognize the pattern of the existing French alliances in the East, but this was widely regarded to be a mere formality. It was not known to what extent France herself would seek to maintain this alliance pattern in the future. Phipps reported to Halifax on December 7th that the Germans had come with “a large team.” He observed that some question had been raised about Bonnet’s dinner for Ribbentrop on December 6th. The two Jews in the French Cabinet, Secretary for Colonies Georges Mandel, and Secretary for Education Jean Zay, had not been invited. Bonnet explained in a special interview that only a few guests from the French Government, and many non-governmental guests, had been invited. Both Mandel and Zay were invited to the festivities at the German Embassy on the following day. German Ambassador Welczeck had made many unflattering remarks to Bonnet about Ribbentrop, in the period before the visit. Bonnet had considered the source, and he desired to find out for himself. Ribbentrop spoke excellent French, and he and Bonnet were able to engage in several intimate conversations without the presence of an interpreter. However, it seemed later that a serious misunderstanding about future French policy in Eastern Europe resulted from these talks, although it is also possible that later events, rather than the talks themselves, created the confusion. Ribbentrop received the impression that France intended to limit her commitments in Eastern Europe, and Bonnet later denied that he had intended to convey this. Polish Ambassador Juliusz Lukasiewicz was convinced from what he heard after Ribbentrop’s visit that Bonnet had definitely made some remarks about reducing French commitments. Bonnet was concerned about a possible Italian irredentist program at French expense. Ciano had delivered a speech in the Italian Chamber on November 30, 1938. A group of Italian deputies had responded by raising the cry of Italian ethnic claims to Nice, Corsica, and Tunisia. Mussolini, who was a witness of the demonstration, had remained impassive. The Italians denied that the demonstration was officially inspired. Ribbentrop succeeded in reassuring Bonnet about this agitation. He was convinced that although there were many more Italians than Frenchmen in the regions which the deputies had named, Italy had no intention of presenting territorial demands to France. He assured Bonnet that such claims would not receive German support if they were made. Ribbentrop observed that Germany had no regrets in renouncing Alsace-Lorraine, and he added that she would scarcely be willing to make war against France for Italian claims to Djibouti or Corsica. The German Foreign Minister complained about the British attitude toward Germany. He observed significantly that the British leaders apparently regarded the Munich agreement as a mere expedient to gain time in order to prepare for war. Bonnet was impressed by Ribbentrop’s poise, and he later described him as an imperturbable negotiator. Ribbentrop laid a wreath on the tomb of the French unknown soldier on December 7th, and that evening he
    129engaged in lengthy discussions with French political leaders. Monzie noted that Ribbentrop was much at ease in the fashion of the grand seigneur. He spent much time with Joseph Caillaux. The French elder statesman did most of the talking. He advised Ribbentrop about dealing with future problems of German policy, but he did so with tact. Monzie was moved by this serene and lengthy conversation between these two handsome men, who he thought represented the best elements of their respective nations. There were no hostile demonstrations in France during the visit of Ribbentrop. A group of French workers applauded Ribbentrop at the railway station as he departed from Paris on December 8, 1938. There was a further friendly demonstration for Ribbentrop when his train was forced to stop near Creil on the return journey. The Ribbentrop visit was a success, and the Franco-German declaration contributed to the relaxation of tension in Europe. The British were promptly informed by France that no secret agreements had been made, but Halifax continued to be suspicious of French policy, and President Roosevelt in the United States, and Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union, expressed their disapproval of the new treaty. ”

    The Forced War When Peaceful Revision Failed, David L. Hoggan, stran 126 – 129.

  2. Dokler sta zadeve narekovale dve državi, je bilo enostavno. Imele sta tudi konkretne cilje razvoj povojne Evrope na ruševinah druge svetovne vojne. Zdaj so tudi druge članice postale močnejše. Tako gospodarsko kot tudi po številu ljudi in površini. Bivše komunistične države so z bliskovitim razvojem povečevale tudi svoj vpliv. In dejstvo je, da je demokracija v vzhodnih državah na drugačni stopnji kot v zahodnih. V vzhodnih je demokracija še vedno povezana z odcepljanjem od komunizma. Največja ironija pa je, da se zdaj komunisti pritožujejo nad tem, da ko se njih umakne od oblasti, da to razglašajo za zmanjševanje demokracije. Zakaj tega zahodne razvite države ne komentirajo in dovoljujejo takšne socialistične izpade? Po mojem mnenju bi zahodne države želele malo zavreti napredek vzhodnih držav, saj še vedno želijo imeti največji vpliv v EU. In zato dovolijo stalno izpostavljanje Poljske, Češke, Madžarske in zdaj še Slovenije.

    • Res je.
      Zahod ne razume Vzhodnih držav, ki jih je tlačil Komunizem – skoraj 50 let.

      Smešno pa je, kar je v bistvu žalostno, da se v EU parlamentu zgraža prav Fajonova, da je v Sloveniji premalo vladavine prava.

      Tu bi morali ZAHTEVATI, da Fajonova pove, da so v glavnem – na vodilnih položajih v SODSTVU, še vedno sodniki, ki so jih tja postavili KOMUNISTI, katere sedaj zastopa doma in v EU, prav FAJONOVA.

      Povedati je tudi potrebno, da stranka Fajonove si je zamenjala le-ime. Iz Komunistov, so se preimenovali v Social demokrate. Njihovo delovanje, pa je daleč od Demokratov, ker so v bistvu postali “Levi-Fašisti”, ki RUŠIJO demokracijo.
      Levičarji hočejo na silo izsiliti Levo vlado, kot so jo imeli že leta 1945.

      Menjava imena iz Komunistov v Demokrate, pa je lepo prikazana v slovenskem pregovoru:
      “Osel lahko menja dlako, navade pa nikoli ne menja”.

      • Menjava imena iz Komunistov v Demokrate, pa je lepo prikazana v slovenskem pregovoru:
        “Osel lahko menja dlako, navade pa nikoli ne menja”.

        Čudovit pregovor, ki trenutno v Sloveniji velja izključno za Janeza Janšo!

  3. Več kot očitno postaja, da skušajo politično pristran(kar)ski medijski kritiki aktualne slovenske zunanje politike, ki dobesedno “vstaja od mrtvih” po katastrofalnem desetletju neambicioznosti in brezbrižnosti zunanjih ministrov Vajgla, Žbogarja, Erjavca in Cerarja, zdaj zanetiti in populistično razpihati morebitni notranji spor in spopad med pristaši javno izraženih pogledov in stališč predsednika RS Boruta Pahorja ter javno izraženih stališč in prioritet aktualnega zunanjega ministra Logarja ter vlade RS.
    Prvi naj bi trdno varoval skupne in monolitne interese združene Evrope pod tradicionalno dominacijo Nemčije in Francije, vlada in minister Logar pa naj bi domnevno “nevarno nagibala” slovensko “zunanjepolitično barko” v smer “novih” držav članic EU iz srednje Evrope oz. višegrajske skupine, ki je nenadoma postala med medijskimi dreserji in spin-doktorji zunanje politike z levice in skrajne levice kar sinonim za medijsko demonizirano “orbanizacijo” zunanje politike, za nevarno konfliktno razmerje med neoporečno “staro” in sumljivo “novo” Evropo, za populistično medijsko sproducirano vprašljivost veljave mednarodnega prava in vladavine prava nasploh v sumljivih državah višegrajske skupine in njihovih morebitnih zaveznikih itd., ipd.
    Na omenjena zlonamerna politikantska in medijska natolcevanja in zavajanja je skušal že včeraj ustrezno pomirljivo odreagirati novi uradni glasnik zunanjega ministrstva, veleposlanik dr. Geržina, ki je opozoril na temeljno in naravno soodvisnost in povezanost med državami članicami EU iz “stare” Evrope in članicami iz “nove” Evrope oz. višegrajske skupine ter na škodljivost vsakršnega apriorističnega medsebojnega izključevanja ali celo medsebojnega sovražnega stigmatiziranja.
    Sicer pa dobro vemo, kdo v slovenski samo-destruktivni strankokraciji vztrajno politično, ideološko in populistično izključuje na domačem političnem peskovniku in komu je izključevanje že doslej bil tudi edini priljubljeni “modus vivendi” na mednarodnem političnem parketu skupnosti EU.

    • Res je. Tudi RTV pomaga širiti laži.

      Toda ve se, kdo v Sloveniji hujska k IZKLJUČEVANJU. RTV, je dala možnost, da sta pred leti na RTV povedala javno, tako Jankovič, kot Erjavec, da z Janšovo stranko, nikoli nebodo šli v koalicijo. Temu so sledile vse Leve stranke.

      Šele, ko je Šarec “zbežal” in prepustil “avtobus brez šoferja”, je pristopil k reševanju le tega Janša, ki se mu je pridružila še desno-sredinska Nova Slovenija in še dve Levo-sredinski stranki, tako SMC, kot Desus.

      Sedaj pa se Levica vsak dan močno trudi, da bi to vlado “zminirala”.
      Vsako potezo vlade, kot tudi “Blejski stratežki furum”, pa Levica, skupaj s SD, takoj problematizira in “poliva z gnojnico”.

      Vendar sedanjo zunanjo politiko lahko samo pohvalimo, ker se res trudi, da bi imeli z vsemi državami dobre odnose. In tako je tudi prav.

  4. Treba je reči bobu bob!

    Če nas v Evropi na silo združujejo le migranti in mavričarji, potem take Evrope ne potrebujemo, ker bo kratkega diha.

    Pri nas je že 50 % prebivalstva migrantskega izvora, ki smo jih v glavnem po zaslugi levice pridelali v zadnjih 30 letih, pospešeno pa pod tremi zaporednimi nesposobmnimi in škodljivimi levimi vladami.

    Torej smo v tem smislu že jedrna država Evrope, ker imamo v primerjavi z avtohtonim prebivalstvom največje število migrantov.

    Mavričarji pa so itak tako glasni, da se ustvarja vtis, da so v večini.

  5. Kar mje razloženo in komentirano, lahko pogledamo še z ene strani:
    Ni res, da so zahodne države zaspale in prepustile vzhodne priključitvene same sebi in se zato demokratizacija ni razvijala, kot bi se morala in zato tudi ne gospodarstvo teh držav.
    Do tega je prišlo, ker je zaspala, ostala neaktivna tako imenovana desna in sredinska stran politike zahoda, socialistična oz. socialdemokratska in liberalna, anarhistična itd. pa zelo aktivna in potegnila s tajkunsko mafijo na vzgodu in zato imamo, kar imamo. Je ta levo/liberalna opcija vedela, ka počne in da je v bistvu podprla socializem oz. malo preižoblečeni komunizem?!, to jo še čaka, kajti komunisti jim tega ne bodo hvaležni, ko skupaj s teroristi vseh dežel ustvarijo krvavo morijo in uničenje evropske demokracije, kulture in standarda: sledi “porušena Evropa!”
    Evropski ddeemokrati prebudite se!, če ni prepozno.
    Ali je komunizem sam zbral denar za RDEČO revolucijo? Ali je Hitler oz. nacio/fašizem sam zbral denar za svoj vzpon? NE, TISTI SO GA PODPRLI, PROTI KATERIM SE JE POTEM
    OBRNIL IN Z NJIMI KRUTO OBRAČUNAL!!! Tukaj se zgodovino ponavlja že tudi od prej…
    Poleg kurjih političnih možganov, še kurja slpota ob somraku….
    Kdo so bili prisiljeni ali zavedeni vojaki komunistične revolucije v Sloveniji, če je bilo čez 90% kristjanov?
    Nič novbega, samo obnova spomina, izjušenj…, ne nekih napovedi brez izkušenj in dokazov. Seveda, zlagana pravljica zgodovine trdi drugače in to učijo že desetletja, nekje 100 let!

      • Z Evropo bo konec ko bo sefiat prevzel oblast.Edaj uvažajo migrante in se sanja o vojski EU.Kdo bo v vojski,ce avtohtonih drzavljanov skoraj ni.Torej Evropi sledi stari Rim z najemnisko vojsko in tako bo propadla rudi Evropa.Pastala bo crna celina z islamom.To bomo pustili našim zanamcem z globalizacijo in selitvijo narodov.Sicer je pa to že Nostradamus napovedal,in cas se izteka,da se ta napoved uresniči,da se bodo ob Renu pasle kameli. In kdo se krčevito bori proti temu,Višegrajske države,kot so se proti Turkom.LpM

  6. ” Zahod nikoli ni želel dojeti, da je bil Vzhod zaradi komunizma v petdesetletnem zaostanku pri izgradnji demokratičnih institucij. ”
    Tole mi je zelo všeč. In je tudi res!. Komunističen vzhod je bil za njih poceni delovna sila in naraven ščit pred ruskim komunizmom.
    Zato so ga dopuščali in jih tudi sedaj ne zanima!!
    Torej?

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